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Abstract
The post-2008 period focused attention on “twin-crises”. Banking crises may
lead to sovereign crises where fiscal vulnerabilities are exacerbated by the ex-
tension of support for the banking system. We develop a model that describes
private sector generated capital inflow that is used to finance investment and
consumption expenditure. In the event of an economic contraction, the (con-
vex) haircut on outstanding debt is negotiated, or bargained, centrally by the
sovereign. Two results arise: the volume of debt and haircut rate are ineffi-
cient. In this setting the accumulation of capital achieves two goals. First, it
generates sufficient optimism about future income to allow the debt market
to function. Second, and counter-intuitively, it increases expected haircuts
by raising the value of the outside option of complete default. These compet-
ing forces characterize the optimal balanced-budget macroprudential policy
targeting capital investment.
Keywords: open economy, capital flows, debt, default, renegotiation
JEL Codes: F34, G15, G18
1 Introduction
Global banking-financial systems have become increasingly integrated since
the 1980s. This has resulted in debt-denominated capital flows driving pri-
vate sector credit growth. Although such flows have promoted growth and
investment, they also exacerbated vulnerabilities in domestic systems that
required sovereign support. The literature on the “twin-crises” of banking
and sovereign has emphasized the interconnected nature of banking-financial
sector and fiscal vulnerabilities.1 Indeed such crises may originate from ei-
ther sector: in Iceland they began in the banking sector whereas in Greece
they originated in the sovereign. In this paper we focus on crises origi-
nating from private-sector generated external debt that ultimately required
sovereign support.
In practice governments may “bail-out” banking-financial institutions by
transferring their indebtedness onto the sovereign balance sheet.2 In our
model the sovereign negotiates with foreign lenders over the outstanding na-
tional stock of external debt. This process results in a “hair-cut”, or partial
default on what is to be repaid, that is then relayed to private sector bor-
rowers. Our framework allows us to examine the role of centralized bargain-
ing abstracting from fiscal considerations. Private sector debtors anticipate
future hair-cuts on their debt before accumulating external debt. The pecu-
niary externality arising from privately accumulated debt renders the level of
debt, and consequently the rate of default, inefficiently low. If the bargaining
power of the sovereign is particularly low, private sector debt may collapse as
1Balteanu and Erce (2014) documents systematic differences between ‘single’ and ‘twin’
crises and examine the feedback loop between fiscal and financial distress. Reinhart and
Rogoff (2013) show that banking crises cause severe contractions in fiscal revenues, raising
government debt by about 86% in the years following the crisis.
2In the period following 2008 governments of advanced economies issued guarantees
of bank debt, initiated renegotiations with bank creditors, undertook bank bailouts and
nationalizations and sought assistance from big international lenders (e.g. the ‘troika’)
to finance bank recapitalizations. An important lesson we can draw from these episodes:
when faced with looming banking crises, governments attempt to mitigate losses of the
financial system by taking charge over the fate of bank debt. For this reason sovereign
spreads are affected by risks in the banking system. Acharya et al. (2014) examine the
period of 2007-2009 associated with bank bailouts in Europe and find that the bailouts
of banks by European governments triggered a hike in sovereign bond spreads. Reinhart
and Rogoff (2011a) document that banking crises usually either precede or coincide with
sovereign debt crises, and find that banking crises help explain sovereign defaults. Arel-
lano and Kocherlakota (2014) arrive at a similar conclusion, and stipulate that domestic
financial crises are typically associated with large transfers from the sovereigns to the pri-
vate sector. The interconnection between bank and sovereign spreads is best examined by
following the unraveling of the Irish crisis, see Appendix A.
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required repayments in economic contractions are prohibitive. More surpris-
ingly, if the bargaining power of the sovereign is too high it may also collapse.
This is because lenders rationally expect higher hair-cuts and demand higher
interest rates on flows to the point that gains-to-trade are exhausted. As we
focus on private-sector flows, our model provides for explicit consideration
of macro-prudential policies. We show that policies that reduce the relative
price of capital (or, equivalently, provide incentives for investment) counter
the pecuniary externality, stimulate flows and improve efficiency. Such poli-
cies may even generate flows where otherwise, due to pessimistic expectations
of repayment, capital flows may collapse.
Models of national defaults typically incorporate losses associated with
default events. In some models defaults are followed by output losses (e.g.
Arellano 2008, Aguiar and Gopinath 2006, Asonuma and Trebesch 2016),
in other models (welfare) losses are concurrent (e.g. Peiris and Tsomocos
(2015), Walsh (2015a), Walsh (2015b)). Our model abstracts from these con-
siderations and instead focuses on losses that occur ex ante and are driven by
expectations of future defaults.3 These expectations influence current capital
investment and alter the path of capital stock. The majority of models on
national defaults omit these effects because they either features endowment
economies, or consider centralized versions of their models in which a plan-
ner accounts for the effect her current decisions would have on future welfare
in equilibrium. By contrast, our framework gives rise to pecuniary exter-
nalities originating from the decentralized nature of borrowing and capital
investment decisions.4
We develop a small open economy model with capital and incomplete
markets that incorporates 1) private sector cross border flows (modeled as
decentralized borrowing) and 2) renegotiation of private debt handled by the
government (modeled as Nash Bargaining).
Our model yields endogenous partial defaults that occur in ‘bad times’,
following unfavorable output shocks. In this context default can be thought
of as an insurance against economic slowdowns.5 We argue, however, that
decentralized nature of the economy and the bargaining process introduce
inefficiencies that impair consumption smoothing. First, we show that the
haircut resulting from renegotiation is ‘too low’ and that higher haircuts
expected ex ante could be pareto-improving. Second, we show that higher
3We also abstract from the link between defaults and currency devaluations examined
in Na et al. (2014) and Schreger and Du (2014).
4Examples of other models of decentralized borrowing and centralized default are Kim
and Zhang (2012) and Na et al. (2014).
5Our model shares this feature with the prominent studies of the field targeting devel-
oping economies, such as Arellano (2008), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Yue (2010).
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bargaining power of the borrower does not fully resolve this problem: when
bargaining power is ‘too high’, borrowing ex ante ceases to be possible. Fi-
nally, we investigate the role of macro-prudential policy and show that a
subsidy on capital investment financed by a lump-sum tax can alleviate both
problems: it can raise expected haircut on debt in ‘bad times’ and make
borrowing sustainable ex ante, even when absent the subsidy investors do
not lend.
This setup allows us to study properties of an economy displaying con-
strained suboptimality, as in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), in
which there is room for pareto-improving macroprudential policies. Our
study contributes to the discussion in Dubey et al. (2005a), Peiris and Tsomo-
cos (2015) and Walsh (2015b), who examine the interaction between market
incompleteness, default rates and equilibrium allocations. We develop the
ideas of Jeske (2006), Wright (2006) and Kim and Zhang (2012) who high-
light importance of and channels through which decentralized debt affects
capital flows and default.
Our finding that raising capital through capital subsidy can improve wel-
fare echoes the result of Peiris and Vardoulakis (2013), that higher savings
ex ante reduce expected default rates. The intuition behind their result is
that current savings raise future consumption and reduce the marginal util-
ity gain from defaulting. In our model this mechanism operates through
capital: higher capital today makes repayment sustainable tomorrow. An
important distinction is that in our model optimal capital subsidy results in
more default, not less. This happens because of bargaining. Raising capital
requires borrowing more, but larger debt in the future makes full default
more attractive compared to partial restructuring. This improves house-
holds’ stance during renegotiation: when home country has little to gain
from renegotiating with the creditors, it repays less.
Recent empirical findings of Trebesch and Zabel (2016) suggest that the
process of debt renegotiation (and the degree of debtor coerciveness) plays an
important role in defining economic dynamics after defaults. Our framework
shares some key elements with Yue (2010) who introduces Nash bargaining
as a means of determining default decisions and recovery rates.6 Although
we follow Yue (2010) in the way we model bargaining between risk-neutral
lenders and the government, in our model borrowing decisions are made by
atomistic households that do not internalize the effect their current choices
will have on future bargaining outcome. We show that in this setup lower ex-
6Other examples of models with defaults that feature Nash Bargaining protocol are
Asonuma and Trebesch (2016), where the borrower may also choose to initiate a pre-
emptive restructuring, and Arellano and Bai (2014), in which two borrowing countries
simultaneously renegotiate with a common lender.
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pected equilibrium default rates hinder potential for consumption smoothing
across states.7
In contrast to the literature on sovereign default along the lines of Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981) (e.g. Yue 2010, Arellano 2008, Aguiar and Gopinath
2006, Kim and Zhang 2012) that describe endowment economies, in our
model capital and investment play a central role. Capital serves as a form
of inter-period commitment that ensures repayment in the future and allows
for positive borrowing ex ante. We show that if capital is subsidized it can
deliver higher average levels of debt to GDP in equilibrium, because such a
subsidy ensures that positive borrowing is always sustainable.
Our argument concerning optimal default rates is connected to that of
D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2016), who also examine an economy with incom-
plete markets and stipulate that default can be chosen optimally to promote
consumption smoothing. Unlike our paper, their work features defaults on
both domestic and foreign creditors, and examines how defaults can serve to
optimally redistribute resources across heterogeneous agents.
We also contribute to literature that models default costs as non-pecuniary
losses developed by Shubik and Wilson. (1977) and Dubey et al. (2005b) and
applied in Tsomocos (2003), Goodhart et al. (2005), Goodhart et al. (2006),
De Walque et al. (2010) and Goodhart et al. (2016). We show that the al-
location obtained in a model with bargaining can be replicated in a model
with properly specified non-pecuniary loss. Within this literature our model
shares many features with Peiris and Tsomocos (2015), who set up a two pe-
riod large open international economy model with incomplete markets and
default, and Walsh (2015a) and Walsh (2015b), that examine a small open
dynamic incomplete markets economy.
In section 2 we introduce our baseline 3 period model, where in the first
period representative households make decisions about capital and borrow-
ing, while in the second period after uncertainty is realized they may choose
to renegotiate the amount of repayment. If renegotiation occurs, the de-
fault rate is chosen to solve the Nash bargaining problem. In subsection 2.2
we show that this economy is equivalent to a decentralised economy where
households decide on their individual rates of default by evaluating the (non-
pecuniary) costs and benefits of defaulting. As this equivalent economy fits
into standard general equilibrium methodology, we then use it to derive equi-
librium properties of our baseline model. In subsection 3.1 we show that bar-
gaining mechanism may prevent consumption smoothing. We calibrate our
7Another important difference between our setup and that of Yue (2010) is that in our
model the economy does not experience output losses or market exclusion in an equilibrium
with orderly renegotiation. We believe, however, that these features would not affect our
qualitative results.
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model to capture features of European debt crisis following 2008 and com-
pare equilibria in a model with bargaining and a model where default rates
accommodate full consumption smoothing. In subsection 3.2 we prove that
when bargaining power is too high, borrowing becomes infeasible ex ante. In
section 4 we set up a centralized version of our model and show that a planner
can resolve this problem by manipulating the amount of capital investment.
In section 5 we go back to a decentralized economy and demonstrate that a
government can replicate main features of the centralized solution by intro-
ducing a subsidy on capital investment.
1.1 Defaults and default costs
Empirical studies show that defaults lead to capital market exclusion, a de-
crease in FDI flows (see Fuentes and Saravia 2010), a reduction in trade
between borrowing and lending countries (see Rose 2005). Furthermore,
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b) provide evidence linking sovereign defaults and
banking crises, while Arteta and Hale (2008) show that defaults are associ-
ated with a reduction of foreign credit to the private sector. Thus, empirical
evidence suggests that defaults are typically accompanied by economic slow-
downs. Theoretical studies interpret this evidence twofold: as indicative of
1) defaults being triggered by economic downturn and 2) defaults causing
further output losses. These assumptions give rise to a tight negative corre-
lation between defaults and output. In practice, as noted by Panizza et al.
(2009), it is hard to disentangle the cause and the effect. For example, it
may be that fears of looming default trigger distress in the banking sector
which deepens the recession; the recession in turn exacerbates sovereign de-
fault crisis, and by the time government defaults, the losses associated with
default has already occurred.This reasoning is reinforced by the findings of
Yeyati and Panizza (2011) who use quarterly data—higher frequency than
commonly used—to show that output losses typically precede default events,
not vice versa.
Furthermore, Tomz and Wright (2007) argue that the evidence for de-
faults occurring in slowdowns is weak, based on dataset covering the period
1820-2004 and 175 debtor countries. In their sample, only 62% of the 169
defaults began when output was below trend. Moreover, when the authors
look at all years in which countries were in default, they find that about 44%
of those years coincided with output being above trend, which again casts
doubt on the notion of defaults causing output declines. Overall, defaults
coincided with output being 1.6 percentage points below trend on average.
Even if this can be attributed to default causing output loss, this cost is
still lower than 2% output loss assumed by Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and
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Yue (2010). To sum up, the evidence of defaults causing (and being cased
by) economic downturn is not as clear cut as the distinction adopted by the
theoretical literature.
These considerations suggest that default is not just insurance against
bad output shocks and, according to Tomz and Wright (2007), this poses a
question of why countries do not default enough in ‘bad’ times. Our method-
ology can provide a partial explanation for this puzzle. First, to generate
positive borrowing and default, our model does not have to rely on equilib-
rium default losses: in our baseline framework output losses only occur if
the country refuses to renegotiate and exercises its outside option, default-
ing by full amount and entering permanent autarky. The losses associated
with outside option are not observed in equilibrium—therefore, our frame-
work is flexible enough to allow for a less tight negative correlation between
default and output. Second, by introducing bargaining we allow for an extra
variable governing the timing of default events—the borrower’s bargaining
power. Variation in this parameter can potentially explain, why sometimes
countries choose to continue repayment even though the economy is in bad
shape, while other times the default ensues even when economy is doing
well. Third, in our model decentralized borrowing helps explain why default
is an imperfect mean for insuring against bad output shocks. Unlike in Yue
(2010), in our model households that borrow do not fully internalize the ef-
fect of their decisions on the bargaining outcome, default probabilities and
the bond price. We show that introducing such centralized borrowing would
improve consumption smoothing.
2 Model
In this section we present a model that features decentralized borrowing by
private agents and collective default. When we refer to partial default or
default rates, we mean haircuts that are a successful outcome of bargaining
where debtors agree to repay a portion of outstanding debt. When we refer to
full or complete default, we mean the breakdown of renegotiation resulting in
creditors receiving nothing. In subsection 2.1 we consider a setup along the
lines of Yue (2010), in which the borrowers bargain with risk-neutral lenders
over default rates, and the outcome is determined via a Nash Bargaining
Solution. In subsection 2.2 we construct an alternative model, in which
default has no direct material costs, but instead leads to non-pecuniary losses
in household utility. We specify the non-pecuniary losses in a way that allows
replicating the allocation in the bargaining model of subsection 2.1. As the
setup with non-pecuniary losses proves more convenient for equilibrium and
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welfare analysis, we use it in the subsequent sections to further investigate
the properties of our economy, and refer to it as the λ-equilibrium.
2.1 Nash Bargaining Framework
We consider a model of two countries, Home and Foreign, and three time pe-
riods, t = {0, 1, 2}. Home is inhabited by a unit measure of identical house-
holds, h, and a production technology (Firm). Households supply labour
inelastically at the beginning of every period, before production of final out-
put occurs; households receive competitive wage w. Firms then transform
capital and labour into final output using a constant returns to scale technol-
ogy; they then distribute any profits to Home households. Firms are endowed
with a domestic productive technology A. Furthermore, the firms may raise
their productivity by the share Z, that has to be prepaid by borrowing from
abroad in the intraperiod capital market. When such borrowing is available,
the total factor productivity is A(1 + Z). Access to the intraperiod capital
market is predicated on Home households having the ability to access foreign
capital markets.
Productivity in period 1 is uncertain. At the beginning of period 1, one
of two states is realized, s = {H,L}. In the last period there is no further
uncertainty. Thus, all uncertainty is realized in period 1. In total there are
5 date events, 1 in the first period, 2 in the second period and 2 in the last
period.
Households enter date 0 having rented k−1 units of capital, on which they
receive the gross return R0. They supply a unit of labour l0 to firms and
receive competitive wage w0. In addition to the total rental income from
factors of production, households can borrow from the Foreign country an
amount b0 to be repaid in the second period at gross interest rate I0. We
follow Yue (2010) in assuming that foreign lenders are risk-neutral.
In period 1, households not wishing to honour the full debt due (b0I0)
may send a request to the government to bargain with lenders on a reduced
final repayment. The government then initiates renegotiation, taking the
total requests of households as a given, and acting in their interests. The
outcome of this debt renegotiation—the default rates δ1(s)—is determined
via the Nash Bargaining solution. When bargaining is concluded, the default
rates are reported to households who decide whether to accept, in which
case they repay the agreed rate, or not, in which case they default fully but
incur additional costs. Specifically, households that renege cannot access the
foreign debt market in period 1.
The timing of events is depicted on Figure 1. Bargaining occurs before
any production decisions, therefore, households that do not agree with the
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aggregate bargaining outcome can only rent their second period capital to
firms that are also denied the ability to access the capital markets. Thus the
pecuniary costs of not accepting renegotiation are two-fold: financial autarky
and lower final period total factor productivity.8 Default does not occur in
the last period as there is no uncertainty, so we ignore it. We restrict our
attention to rational expectations equilibria.
Figure 1: Timeline
Renegotiation
Full
default
Full
repayment
Firms cannot borrow Firms cannot borrow
A1 and A2
become known
Households
choose c0, b0, k0
Households
choose δ1
Firms
borrow Z
Firms
produce
Households
choose c1, b1, k1
Firms
borrow Z
Firms
produce
Households
choose c2
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
2.1.1 Firms
Firm productivity depends on two components: a part A that is domestic
and depends on the realization of the state of the world, and a fixed part ∆
that has to be refinanced each period with external debt. Firm’s profit in
each period is:
Π = A(1 + Z)KαL1−α −RK − wL− κZ, (1)
8Formally speaking there are three possibilities: full default, in which case there would
be nothing lent ex ante; partial repayment, in which case the default rate is priced into
the interest rate; and full repayment. As only the latter two are possible in equilibrium,
we ignore the case in which a country enters financial autarky in period 1.
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where κ is a cost of refinancing Z. Define output as Y = A(1 + Z)KαL1−α
Optimality implies:
R = α
Y
K
, (2)
w = (1− α)Y
L
. (3)
2.1.2 Home Households
Households are identical; their lifetime utility is:
u(c0) +
∑
s=L,H
pi(s)
2∑
τ=1
βτu(cτ (s)), (4)
where pi(s) > 0 is the probability of the state s occurring, and
∑S
s=1 pi(s) = 1.
The budget constraints are:
c0 + k0 = w0l0 +R0k−1 + b0, (5)
c1(s) + k1(s) + (1− δ1(s))b0I0 = w1(s)l1(s) +R1(s)k0 + b1(s), (6)
c2(s) + b1(s)I1(s) = w2(s)l2(s) +R2(s)k1(s), (7)
where ct(s), kt(s), wt(s), Rt(s) are consumption, capital, wage and return on
capital in period t, state s; b0 is the amount borrowed in period 0; I0 is the
gross interest on household borrowing due in period 1, and δ1(s) is the rate of
default; b1(s) is borrowing in period 1 state s, and I1(s) is the gross interest
to be paid next period. Labour is supplied inelastically l0 = l1(s) = l2(s) = 1,
∀s ∈ {H,L}.
First order conditions that solve households’ problem are:
∂u(c0)
∂c0
= βI0
2∑
s=1
pi(s)(1− δ1(s))∂u(c1(s))
∂c1(s)
, (8)
∂u(c0)
∂c0
= β
2∑
s=1
pi(s)R1(s)
∂u(c1(s))
∂c1(s)
, (9)
∂u(c1(s))
∂c1(s)
= βI1(s)
∂u(c2(s))
∂c2(s)
, (10)
R2(s) = I1(s). (11)
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2.1.3 Foreign Households
Foreign country is populated by identical households with lifetime utility:
cf0 +
2∑
s=1
pi(s)
2∑
τ=1
βτcfτ (s) (12)
Their budget constraints are:
cf0 + b
f
0 + s
f
0 = y
f
0 (13)
cf1(s) + s
f
1(s) = y
f
1 (s) + I
w
0 s0 + (1− δ1(s))I0bf0 (14)
cf2(s) = y
f
2 (s) + I
w
1 (s)s
f
2(s) + I1(s)b
f
2(s) (15)
Foreign bonds, sf , are riskless. They are traded at an exogenous world
interest rate Iwt . Utility maximization demands:
1 = βI0
2∑
s=1
pi(s)(1− δ1(s)), (16)
1 = βIw1 (s), (17)
1 = βIw1 (s). (18)
Additionally, no arbitrage implies
I1(s) = I
w
1 (s). (19)
2.1.4 Nash Bargaining and Equilibrium
Our Nash Bargaing setup follows closely that of Yue (2010) featuring bar-
gaining with foreign risk-neutral lenders over debt redemption. The Nash
Bargaining problem determines the default rate outcome by evaluating wel-
fare surpluses gained by each party by participating in bargaining. Formally,
for each s ∈ {H,L}:
δ1(s) =
{
arg maxδ∈[0,1]
[
(∆h1(s))
θ((∆f1(s))
1−θ
]
if ∆h1(s) > 0,
1, else.
(20)
s.t. ∆h1(s) ≥ 0,
∆f1(s) ≥ 0.
The functions ∆h1(s) and ∆
f
1(s) give welfare gains from participating in rene-
gotiation, for Home and Foreign. These surpluses are assigned weights that
represent relative bargaining power of each party, with θ corresponding to the
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bargaining power of the borrower, and (1− θ) to the bargaining power of the
lender. For each party, the surplus ∆1(s) is given by the difference between
the value function of repayment, and the value function that would arise if
the agent decided to exit renegotiation (invoking full default). Specifically,
for Home (the borrower):
∆h1(s) = {V R}h1(s)− {V A}h1(s), (21)
where {V R}h1(s) gives value function under renegotiation:
{V R}h1(s) = u(c1(s)) + βu(c2(s)), (22)
and {V A}h1(s) gives value function under financial autarky:
{V A}h1(s) = u(c1(s, a)) + βu(c2(s, a)). (23)
Similarly, for the Foreign (the lender):
∆f1(s) = {V R}f1(s)− {V A}f1(s), (24)
where {V R}f1(s) is foreign households’ value of renegotiation:
{V R}f1(s) = cf1(s) + βcf2(s), (25)
and {V A}f1(s) is their value of autarky:
{V A}f1(s) = cf1(s, a) + βcf2(s, a). (26)
In our model, autarky means the absence of financial trade between Home
and Foreign. As such, it has different implications for the two countries. For-
eign country has access to unlimited risk-free borrowing, and can still trade
with the rest of the world if it decides not to trade with Home. By contrast,
Home can only borrow on the international financial market through Foreign.
Thus, for Home the absence of trade has two effects: 1) it impairs productiv-
ity of domestic firms, as they cannot borrow Z to up the return on capital,
and 2) it prevents households from borrowing to smooth consumption.
Exiting renegotiation for a foreign households means receiving 0 from
Home. As the foreign households are risk-neutral, their surplus from renego-
tiation simply equals the amount they gain by agreeing to renegotiate:
∆f1(s) = (1− δ1(s))I0bf0 . (27)
For Home, consumption choices under renegotiation can be obtained by
maximizing {V R}h1(s) with respect to period 1 and 2 budget constraints
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(6),(7), and plugging in equilibrium wage (3) and interest rates (2),(18).
Furthermore, assuming CRRA utility, u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ , we can directly solve for
c1(s) and c2(s):
c1(s) =
Iw1
Iw1 + 1
[A1(s)(1 + Z)k
α
0 − (1− δ1(s))b0I0 + (28)
+
1− α
α
[
αA2(s)(1 + Z)
Iw1
] 1
1−α
],
c2(s) = c1(s). (29)
An increase in the default rate δ1(s) or capital k0 raises consumption in both
periods, and raises {V R}h1(s).
When Home enters autarky, the country is no longer able to borrow be-
tween periods 1 and 2. In that case the households would solve:
{V A}h1(s) = u(c1(s, a)) + βu(c2(s, a))→ max (30)
s.t. c1(s) + k1(s) = R1(s, a)k0 + w1(s, a), (31)
c2(s) = R2(s, a)k1(s, a) + w2(s, a). (32)
Solving this problem and plugging autarky consumption choices into (30)
gives the welfare under autarky as function of state and period 1 level of
capital, k0.
An interior solution to the Nash Bargaining problem requires the following
expression to have a zero:
∂u(c1(s))
∂c1(s)
− 1− θ
θ
∆h1(s)
∆f1(s)
. (33)
A solution to this exists if ∆h1(s),∆
f
1(s) > 0. Substituting surpluses of Home
and Foreign, we obtain an equation that determines default rate for cases
when bargaining yields partial default:
u′(c1(s))b0I0 =
1− θ
θ
{V R}h1(s)− {V A}h1(s)
1− δ1(s) . (34)
We can now define equilibrium in our economy.
Definition 1: Decentralized equilibrium with bargaining A set
{δ1(s), I0, Iw0 , Iw1 , I1(s), Rt(s), wt(s), ct(s), kt(s), bt(s), cft (s), sft (s), bft (s)} is a
competitive equilibrium with rational expectations if:
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1. Given allocation and interest rates, each δ1(s) solves Nash Bargaining
Problem (20);
2. Given all δ1(s), the interest rate on risky bonds satisfies (16);
3. Risk-free interest rates satisfy foreign household’s first order conditions
(17) and (18);
4. Given interest rates and default rates, ct(s), kt(s), bt(s) satisfy Home
household’s budget constraints (5)-(7) and first order conditions (8)-
(11);
5. Given interest rates and default rates, cft (s), s
f
t (s), b
f
t (s) satisfy Foreign
budget constraints (13)-(15);
6. The return on Home capital, Rt(s), and Home wage, wt(s), satisfy
firms’ first order conditions (2) and (3);
7. No arbitrage for risk-free interest rates holds: I1(s) = I
w
1 (s);
8. Asset markets clear at bft (s) = bt(s)
In the next subsection we construct an equivalent economy (in terms of
allocation), in which debtors incur a non-pecuniary punishment proportional
to default rates.
2.2 Non-Pecuniary costs
In subsection 2.1 we described a model in which full default on the debt
led to productivity losses and financial autarky. This section presents an
alternative model, in which default is associated with utility losses rather
than direct material costs. Particularly, we assume that a default rate δ1(s)
is associated with a loss of utility δ1(s)λ(s), and the borrower’s expected
utility reads:
u(c0) +
S∑
s=1
pi(s)
{
2∑
τ=1
βτu(cτ (s))− βλ(s) ·max {δ1(s), 0}
}
(35)
We specify utility loss λ(s) in a way that allows matching equilibrium allo-
cation of subsection 2.1:
λ(s) =
1− θ
θ
{ ¯V R}h1(s)− { ¯V A}h1(s)
1− δ¯1(s)
, (36)
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where { ¯V R}h1(s), { ¯V A}h1(s) are aggregate values of repayment and autarky,
and δ¯1(s) is the aggregate default rate. According to this definition, the non-
pecuniary cost is an increasing function of 0 ≤ δ1(s) ≤ 1, and at δ1(s) = 1
we have λ(s) = +∞. Therefore, provided that { ¯V R}h1(s) − { ¯V A}h1(s) > 0,
full default with autarky remains an out of equilibrium outcome.
The budget and resource constraints of this economy are identical to
those defined in subsection 2.1. First order conditions for firms, households
and foreign lenders mirror those stated before with one exception: in the
household problem, there is now one additional optimality condition per
state governing the choice of the default rate δ1(s). As the households do not
internalize the effect their decisions have on aggregate values and on λ(s),
household’s optimization over δ1(s) simply requires:
u′(c1(s))b0I0 = λ(s) ≡
≡ 1− θ
θ
{ ¯V R}h1(s)− { ¯V A}h1(s)
1− δ¯1(s)
, (37)
that is, the marginal gain from an increase in the default rate must match
the marginal loss. In equilibrium all aggregate values match their individual
choice counterparts—therefore, the condition in the non-pecuniary economy
that determines the (interior) default rate is identical to that of the Nash
Bargaining model (see eq. 34).
This alternative formulation of the problem proves intuitive when dis-
cussing partial-equilibrium outcomes, because it allows to address the prob-
lem by comparing marginal gains and losses of a default decision. For exam-
ple, if, given current allocation, the interest rates and a δˆ1(s), a household
observes u′(c1(s))b0I0 > λ(s), this means that from the household’s viewpoint
the marginal gain from raising the default rate is higher than the marginal
cost, thus, the default rate δˆ1(s) is too small. A full repayment occurs when,
given δ1 = 0, a household observes u
′(c1(s))b0I0 − λ(s) ≤ 0, that is, the
marginal gain from defaulting is lower or equal to the marginal cost at the
δ1 = 0 corner solution.
3 Properties of the decentralized
equilibrium
In this section we examine the relationship between model parameters and
the properties of the equilibrium outlined above. In subsection 3.1 we show
that default rates that allow for consumption smoothing exceed those gen-
erated in equilibrium of the model with bargaining. In subsection 3.2 we
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investigate whether this problem can be mitigated by raising the bargaining
power of the borrowers. We conclude that this is not always the case: when
bargaining power becomes ‘to high’, borrowing ceases to be possible ex ante.
3.1 Optimal default
In this section we construct an economy, in which default rates in both states
are exogenously given; we call the equilibrium associated with this model a
δ-equilibrium. We show that for this economy if there exists a pair of default
rates that ensures full consumption smoothing, then a default rate in high
state must be higher than that in the low state. We contrast the allocation
under optimal default rates with that generated in economy with bargaining,
and show numerically that the latter is associated with lower Home household
expected welfare.9
3.1.1 δ-equilibrium
Consider a reduced version of the economy set up in subsection 2.1, in which
there is no bargaining but instead the default rates δ1(L) and δ1(H) are exoge-
nously given. In this economy budget constraints and first order conditions
of Home and Foreign households and firms are the same as in subsection 2.1.
The following definition of equilibrium applies.
Definition 2: Decentralized δ-equilibrium Given δ¯1(L) and δ¯1(H),
a set {I0, Iw0 , Iw1 , I1(s), Rt(s), wt(s), ct(s), kt(s), bt(s), cft (s), sft (s), bft (s)} is a
competitive δ-equilibrium with rational expectations if:
1. Given all δ1(s), the interest rate on risky bonds satisfies (16);
2. Risk-free interest rates satisfy foreign household’s first order conditions
(17) and a(18);
3. Given interest rates and default rates, ct(s), kt(s), bt(s) satisfy Home
household’s budget constraints (5)-(7) and first order conditions (8)-
(11);
4. Given interest rates and default rates, cft (s), s
f
t (s), b
f
t (s) satisfy Foreign
budget constraints (13)-(15);
5. The return on Home capital, Rt(s), and Home wage, wt(s), satisfy
firms’ first order conditions (2) and (3);
9The expected welfare of Foreign households remains unchanged regardless of the
model, as those households are risk-neutral and the interest rate on risky bonds reflects
expected default rates.
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6. No arbitrage for risk-free interest rates holds: I1(s) = I
w
1 (s);
7. Asset markets clear at bft (s) = bt(s)
We now show that for the case of risk-neutral lenders for each pair 0 ≤
δ∗1(L), δ
∗
1(H) < 1 there exists an infinite number of pairs δ
∗∗
1 (L), δ
∗∗
1 (H) that
give rise to the same allocation in δ-equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Consider a pair of default rates 0 ≤ δ∗1(L), δ∗1(H) < 1.
There exists an infinite number of pairs of state-specific default rates that
replicate δ-equilibrium allocation associated with 0 ≤ δ∗1(L), δ∗1(H) < 1.
Proof. Because investors are risk-neutral, in δ-equilibrium the interest rate
on bonds is pinned down by the default rates 0 ≤ δ∗1(L), δ∗1(H) < 1 and does
not depend on the allocation:
I∗0 =
Iw∑
s=L,H pi(s)(1− δ∗1(s))
.
Notice that the budget constraints of the household problem (5), (6) only
include the interest rate I0 in conjunction with a repayment rate in one of
the state 1 − δ(s). Thus, the model can be rewritten in terms of products
I0(1 − δ1(s)), and the δ-equilibrium allocation c∗, k∗, b∗ can be expressed as
a function of exogenous products (1− δ∗1(s))I∗0 . Rewrite the products as:
(1− δ∗1(L))I∗0 =
Iw1
pi(L) + (1− pi(L))1−δ∗1(H)
1−δ∗1(L)
,
(1− δ∗1(H))I∗0 =
Iw1
pi(L)
1−δ∗1(L)
1−δ∗1(H) + (1− pi(L))
.
Notice that the right-hand sides of both equations are functions of
1−δ∗1(L)
1−δ∗1(H) .
As allocation is a function of products (1 − δ∗1(s))I∗0 , we can alternatively
express the allocation as a function of
1−δ∗1(L)
1−δ∗1(H) , rather than δ
∗
1(L) and δ
∗
1(H)
separately. This implies that the allocation will remain the same for all pairs
δ∗∗1 (L), δ
∗∗
1 (H), such that:
1− δ∗1(L)
1− δ∗1(H)
=
1− δ∗∗1 (L)
1− δ∗∗1 (H)
. (38)
Proposition 1 implies that without loss of generality we can set the
smaller default rate to 0: any pair 0 < δ∗1(L), δ
∗
1(H) < 1 has one counterpart
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δ∗∗1 (L), δ
∗∗
1 (H) where one of the default rates is zero, but the allocation is
exactly the same.
Corollary 1.1 A δ-equilibrium allocation associated with default rates
that satisfy 0 < δ∗1(s) < δ
∗
1(−s) < 1 can be replicated under δ1(s) = 0 and
δ1(−s) = 1− 1−δ
∗
1(−s)
1−δ∗1(s) .
To improve consumption smoothing the default rate in the low state has
to be higher than the default rate in the high state. Intuitively, as the
households cannot choose negative capital stock, their income from capital
and labor is always positively correlated with the level of productivity At.
To mitigate fluctuations in consumption, a household would have to default
more when income is low.
Proposition 2. Suppose there exist default rates δ∗1(L), δ
∗
1(H) that ensure
full consumption smoothing in δ-equilibrium with positive borrowing. Then
δ∗1(L) > δ
∗
1(H).
Proof. Denote the δ-equilibrium allocation corresponding to δ∗1(L), δ
∗
1(H) as
c∗, b∗0, k
∗
0, and the associated interest rate I
∗
0 . If full consumption smoothing
is feasible, then c∗1(L) = c
∗
1(H) and (from 28) default rates must be such that:
δ∗1(L)− δ∗1(H) =
(1 + Z)k∗0 [A1(H)− A1(L)] +
b∗0I
∗
0
+
+
1−α
α
(
α(1+Z)
Iw1
) 1
1−α
[
A2(H)
1
1−α − A2(L) 11−α
]
b∗0I
∗
0
.
For positive borrowing, the right-hand side is positive, therefore, δ∗1(L) >
δ∗1(H). By Corollary 1.1, under default rates δ1(L) = 1 − 1−δ
∗
1(L)
1−δ∗1(H) and
δ1(H) = 0, δ-equilibrium allocation exactly matches c
∗, b∗0, k
∗
0.
Therefore, a default schedule that promotes consumption smoothing should
allow for more default in a state with bad productivity shock. In the next
subsections we calibrate our model and solve numerically for the optimal de-
fault rate in δ-equilibrium. We contrast the result with the equilibrium that
arises in a decentralized model with bargaining discussed in subsection 2.1.
3.1.2 Calibration
To capture key aspects of the European debt crisis that followed financial
collapse of 2007-2008, we use statistics that characterize Greek economy of
the corresponding period. We set the risk-free interest rate to 2% which
compares to 1.916% observed for 10-year German bond yields (average for
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January 2010 to October 2014). We follow Angelopoulos et al. (2010) and set
the share of capital income to 0.34. The standard deviation of productivity
shock is set to 1% matching 1% obtained by Bi,Traum (2012) after performing
bayesian estimation of their model on Greek data. We set the productivity
loss from autarky to 40%, and we calibrate the bargaining power to let the
model produce equilibrium with partial default in one state (θ = 0.255).10
As in Yue (2010), we set relative risk aversion in Home households CRRA
utility to σ = 2.
Given these parameters, we compute equilibrium in the decentralized
model with bargaining. The model produces partial default in low state with
a default rate at 11.2%. The interest rate on bonds in our model is 8.1%
(compared to 12.81% observed from January 2010 to January 2015 for Greek
10-year bonds).11 The debt-to-GDP ratio in the default state is 65%.
The upper plot on Figure 2 depicts expected welfare in δ-equilibrium,
E0
∑
t=0,1,2 β
tu(ct), as function of the default rate in low state. The welfare-
maximizing default rate is around 29%. As shown in the right column of
Table 1, this default rates allows for full consumption smoothing across states
in δ-equilibrium, as c0 = c1(L) = c1(H) = c2.
12
Although 29% default in low state guarantees maximum expected wel-
fare, this default rate is not feasible in a model with bargaining. Figure 2
depicts the difference between marginal gains and costs from defaulting in
low and high states corresponding to the λ-equilibrium.13 In subsection 2.2
we established that in equilibrium with bargaining a given state s is associ-
ated with partial default if the marginal gain from defaulting exactly equals
the marginal cost λ, whereas negative difference between marginal gain and
10Productivity loss of 40% compares with estimates of GDP costs that would have arisen
if Greece exited Eurozone, published at the time of the crisis. For instance, a UBS (2011)
study claims that for Greece exiting and abandoning the euro would have meant a 60%
currency devalutaion, a 50% decline in the volume of trade and a loss of 60% of deposits,
amounting up to 50% GDP loss.
11Taken from St Louis FRED database Long-Term Government Bond Yields: 10-year:
Main (Including Benchmark).
12In light of Proposition 1 our result means that there also exists an infinite number
of pairs δ1(L), δ1(H) > 0 that replicate this allocation, but because of Proposition 2 we
know that for all those pairs δ1(L) > δ1(H), and we can therefore limit our attention to
the case where we normalize default rate in high state to 0.
13As shown in subsection 2.2, under our assumptions the model with non-pecuniary
costs (the λ-equilibrium) generates the same allocation as the model with bargaining. Here
we find it more convenient to discuss equilibrium results in terms of marginal gains and
marginal losses from defaulting, using concepts and notation introduced in subsection 2.2.
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Figure 2: Decentralized equilibrium with bargaining vs. optimal δ-
equilibrium
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Notes: the figure depicts values associated with δ-equilibrium depending on δ1(L) and assuming
δ1(H) = 0. The graphs plot expected welfare and differences between the left- and the right-hand
sides of (34) for the two states. Vertical dashed lines mark equbrium δ1(L) in decentralized model, and
an optimal δ1(L) in δ-equilibrium.
loss is associated with full repayment:{
u′(c1(s))I0b0 − λ(s) = 0 for δ(s) > 0,
u′(c1(s))I0b0 − λ(s) < 0 for δ(s) = 0.
(39)
For a default rate of 29% to be supported as equilibrium with bargaining it
must yield c1(L))I0b0 = λ(L) and c1(H))I0b0 ≤ λ(H) in δ-equilibrium. But
on Figure 2 this is not the case: in low state marginal gain is lower than
marginal loss suggesting that a household would benefit from defaulting less,
while in high state it is the reverse. The λ-equilibrium (and the equilibrium
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Table 1: Decentralized equilibrium with bargaining vs. optimal δ-equilibrium
Variable Decentralized maxE0W δ-equilibrium
Welfare home -3.369 -3.361
b0 0.9218 0.9220
δL1 0.112 0.292
I0 1.081 1.195
k0 0.542 0.541
c0 0.874 0.875
c1(L) 0.823 0.875
c1(H) 0.928 0.875
Notes: The table compares equilibrium allocations for the baseline decentralized model and the optimal
δ-equilibrium.
with bargaining) are obtained at a much lower default rate of 11.2%, at which
marginal gains and costs in high and low states comply with the prerequisits
discussed above.
Left column of Table 1 documents that in the decentralized equilibrium
with bargaining consumption differs across time and states, as c0 6= c1(L) 6=
c1(H), while expected welfare is lower than in the optimal δ-equilibrium.
Therefore, bargaining results in an inefficiency that impairs consumption
smoothing, as borrowers do not default ‘enough’.
3.2 Decentralized equilibrium and the bargaining
power
In previous section we concluded that in presence of bargaining consumption
smoothing is imperfect, and that higher default in low state leads to a welfare
improvement for the borrower. In fact, with risk-neutral creditors we can
refine this statement by claiming that more default is pareto-improving, as
higher default rates have no effect on the expected welfare for Foreign country
because, as the default rate rises, so does the risk-neutral interest on bonds.
The remainder of the paper seeks refinements to the model setup that could
bring the equilibrium outcomes closer to those observed under optimal default
rates.
In this section we ask, whether the inefficiency associated with bargain-
ing could be solved by giving the Home borrower higher bargaining power.
Intuitively, more bargaining power for the borrower implies higher haircut,
which should be pareto-improving. However, in this subsection we show that
this logic breaks down when the bargaining power becomes ‘too high’, as it
leads to full default in both states and renders borrowing infeasible ex ante.
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Figure 3: Marginal gains minus losses from defaulting
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Notes: the figures present heat plots for the difference between the left- and the right-hand
sides of (34) for the two states, obtained for δ-equilibrium allocations. For this plot we use
θ = 0.23. Warmer colors (lighter in grayscale) indicate higher values, cooler colors (darker
in grayscale) indicate lower values.
Consider δ-equilibrium in which default rates are exogenous. Figure 3 de-
picts differences between marginal gains and losses from defaulting in low and
high states, for all possible combinations of δ1(L) and δ1(H). By Propo-
sition 1, there is a continuum of pairs of δ1(L), δ1(H) that result in zero
difference between gains and costs—on Figure 3 these combinations are de-
picted by straight lines labeled ‘0’.14 The difference between gains and losses
from defaulting in a given state is higher, when default rate in the alterna-
tive state is substantial. The intuition behind this result is as follows. Given
default rate in state s, when default in states s−1 is high, equilibrium on the
financial market implies higher compensation for the lenders, I0, raising the
gain from defaulting in state s.
Conversely, higher default in state s means lower difference between gains
and losses from defaulting in state s. This result comes from the definition
of λ(s) we adopted to make it reflect the underlying bargaining process:
λ(s) = 1−θ
θ
{ ¯V R}h1 (s)−{ ¯V A}h1 (s)
1−δ1(s) . Higher δ(s) exponentially increases the punish-
ment λ(s) as the denominator approaches 0.
In the full model with bargaining, an equilibrium with positive borrowing
14The lines are defined by δ1(L) = δ
∗
1(s)+(1−δ∗1(s))δ1(H), where δ∗1(s) is an intersection
between each line and the axis δ1(H) = 0, see Proposition 1.
21
exists if there exists a pair δ1(L), δ1(H) such that the associated δ-equilibrium
allocation satisfies conditions given in (39). Because of the way (39) is speci-
fied, there are four qualitatively different possibilities regarding δ1(L), δ1(H):
(i) 0 < δ1(L) ≤ 1 and δ1(H) = 0.
In this case the associated δ-equilibrium allocation must satisfy:{
u′(c1(L))I0b0 − λ(L) = 0,
u′(c1(H))I0b0 − λ(H) ≤ 0.
(ii) δ1(L) = 0 and 0 < δ1(H) ≤ 1.
This requires δ-equilibrium to satisfy:{
u′(c1(L))I0b0 − λ(L) ≤ 0,
u′(c1(H))I0b0 − λ(H) = 0.
(iii) δ1(L) = 0 and δ1(H) = 0.
Then the δ-equilibrium must satisfy:{
u′(c1(L))I0b0 − λ(L) ≤ 0,
u′(c1(H))I0b0 − λ(H) ≤ 0.
(iv) 0 < δ1(L) ≤ 1 and 0 < δ1(H) ≤ 1.
This is feasible if δ-equilibrium is such that:{
u′(c1(L))I0b0 − λ(L) = 0,
u′(c1(H))I0b0 − λ(H) = 0.
In our numerical example, the only equilibrium with bargaining is achieved
at δ1(L) > 0 and δ1(H) = 0, which falls into category (i). To see this, consider
Figure 3a, specifically the pair of default rates at the intersection between
the inclined line that gives zero marginal gains minus losses, and the hori-
zontal axis (δ1(L) ≈ 0.07 and δ1(H) = 0). For this pair, in the low state
the marginal gain from defaulting equals the marginal loss. Furthermore,
in high state the marginal gain from defaulting is negative (see Figure 3b).
Therefore, conditions outlined by (i) hold.
By contrast, there does not exist a pair of default rates δ1(L) = 0 and
0 < δ1(H) ≤ 1 that would satisfy (ii). For some 0 < δ1(H) ≤ 1 to be
supported as equilibrium with bargaining, the associated marginal gain from
defaulting in high state must equal the marginal loss. But according to
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Figure 3b, for all values of δ1(H) lying on the vertical axis marginal losses
from defaulting are higher than marginal gains. Thus, there are no default
rates for which conditions in (ii) would be satisfied.
An equilibrium with full repayment in both states is not feasible either.
Under case (iii), marginal gain must be lower or equal to marginal loss in both
states of δ-equilibrium associated with (0, 0). But according to Figure 3a,
this is not the case for the low state—the conditions specified in (iii) are
violated.
Finally, an equilibrium with partial default in both state is not attainable,
because the lines at which marginal gains equal marginal losses depicted on
Figure 3 (a) and (b) do not intersect at δ1(L), δ1(H) < 1, therefore, conditions
of (iv) do not hold.
This last result applies more generally and holds true for almost all com-
binations of model parameters.
Proposition 3 In general there does not exist a pair δ1(L), δ1(H) ∈ (0, 1)
such that corresponding marginal gains from defaulting equal marginal losses
in both states. Therefore, in the model with bargaining partial default in both
state is not possible in equilibrium.
Proof. By Proposition 1, combinations of default rates associated with zero
marginal gains in low and high state are given by
δ1(L) = δ
∗
1 + (1− δ∗1)δ1(H), (40)
δ1(L) = δ
∗∗
1 + (1− δ∗∗1 )δ1(H), (41)
where δ∗1 is such that u
′(c1(L))b0I0 = λ(L) under δ1(L) = δ∗1, δ1(H) = 0
(i.e. corresponds to intersection between inclined zero line on Figure 3a and
horizontal axis), and δ∗∗1 is such that u
′(c1(H))b0I0 = λ(H) under δ1(L) =
δ∗∗1 , δ1(H) = 0 (same but for Figure 3b).
Writing these two equations as a system and solving in terms of δ1(L), δ1(H)
yields:
δ1(L) = 1,
δ1(H) = 1,
given δ∗1 6= δ∗∗1 . As these two lines do not intersect at default rates below 1,
there are no combinations of default rates smaller than 1 for which marginal
gains equal losses in both states.
Figure 4a plots together the two inclined zero lines depicted on Figure 3(a)
and (b), and illustrates how in the economy with bargaining agents adjusts
their expectations about default rates until equilibrium is reached. For ex-
ample, at δ1(L) = 0.5 and δ1(H) = 0.47 the marginal gain from defaulting
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Figure 4: Marginal gains and losses: equilibrium
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Notes: the figures plot zero lines for the difference between the left- and the right-hand
sides of (34) for the two states, obtained for δ-equilibrium allocations. The graphs differ
by the assumption made about borrowers’ bargaining power.
in low state equals the marginal cost, whereas in high state the loss exceeds
the gain. That means that expected default rate in high state is ‘too high’,
and δ1(H) falls to 0.4, where in high state the marginal loss from defaulting
equals the gain. But at this new combination of default rates the default
rate in low state turns out to be ‘too high’, as the associated loss from de-
faulting is higher than the gain, causing expected δ1(L) to reduce to 0.43,
etc. This process continues until the equilibrium default rates δ1(L) = 0.07
and δ1(H) = 0 are reached.
Now let us compare this economy with the one in which the borrower
has higher bargaining power (θ = 0.30), Figure 4b. As before, zero level
lines of marginal gains minus losses do not intersect, indicating there is no
equilibrium with partial defaults in both state. But unlike on Figure 4a,
we now observe that the zero level line for default in high state is above
that corresponding to the low state. Let us again consider the intersection
between the horizontal axis, δ1(H) = 0, and the line u
′(c1(L))I0b0−λ(L) = 0,
given by δ1(L) = 0.2, δ1(H) = 0. For this combination of default rates
the marginal gain from defaulting in high state exceeds the marginal loss,
meaning that δ1(L) = 0.2, δ1(H) = 0 cannot be supported as equilibrium
with bargaining. In fact, for every combination of δ1(L), δ1(H) < 1 marginal
gain from defaulting more in one of the states (or in both) is higher than the
24
loss.
On Figure 4b we show that in such a setup, given any starting pair of
default rates agents’ expectations will adjust toward higher default rates in
both states, and at the limit both expected default rates will approach 1.
But if agents rationally expect full default in both states, then borrowing
ex ante would not be possible. Therefore, when the borrowers’ bargaining
power equals θ = 0.30, there is no equilibrium with positive borrowing. This
result can be generalized.
Proposition 4 Consider a pair δˆ1(L), δˆ1(H) < 1 that yields δ-equilibrium
with positive borrowing. For each such pair δˆ1(L), δˆ1(H) < 1 there exists
1. a θ¯ such that if θ ≥ θ¯, then in δ-equilibrium originated by δˆ1(L), δˆ1(H)
marginal gains from defaulting exceed marginal losses in both states.
2. a θ such that if θ ≤ θ, then in δ-equilibrium originated by δˆ1(L), δˆ1(H)
marginal losses from defaulting exceed gains in both states.
Proof. Consider a pair 0 ≤ δˆ1(L), δˆ1(H) < 1. Marginal gains from de-
faulting will be positive in both states if:
u′(c1(L))I0b0 > λ(L) ≡ 1− θ
θ
{V R}h1(L)− {V A}h1(L)
1− δˆ1(L)
(42)
u′(c1(H))I0b0 > λ(H) ≡ 1− θ
θ
{V R}h1(H)− {V A}h1(H)
1− δˆ1(H)
(43)
The values of {V R}h1(s), {V A}h1(s), b0, I0 and c1(s) are pinned down by the
δ-equilibrium allocation associated with δˆ1(L), δˆ1(H). The right-hand sides
of both (42) and (43) depend negatively on the borrower’s bargaining power,
θ: higher θ decreases the punishment λ(s) in each state. Furthermore, for
θ = 1 both λ(L) and λ(H) equal zero. At the same time, by assumption
u′(.) > 0, b0 > 0 (equilibrium with positive borrowing), and I0 > 0 (as
δˆ1(L), δˆ1(H) < 1 by assumption). Therefore, (42) and (43) hold for θ = 1.
Since λ(L) and λ(H) depend on θ monotonically, there exists an  > 0 such
that (42) and (43) hold as strict inequalities for θ = 1− . Thus, there exists
a θ¯ such that for any θ > θ¯ inequalities (42) and (43) hold.
Analogously, we observe that given the δ-equilibrium allocation, for each
λ(s) we have: limθ→0 λ(s) =∞. Since the left-hand sides of (42) and (43) are
finite, we can always find a ‘low enough’ θ that will ensure negative difference
between marginal gains and losses in both states.
By Proposition 4, for any δ-equilibrium with positive borrowing there
exists a ‘low enough’ value of the borrower’s bargaining power that will en-
sure that losses from defaulting exceed gains. This implies that it is always
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possible to find a bargaining power such that the equilibrium with bargaining
will result in full repayment in both state.
Corollary 4.1 Suppose that a δ-equilibrium originated by δ1(L) = δ1(H) =
0 is associated with positive borrowing. Then, there exists a θ such that for
all θ < θ there exists an equilibrium in the model with bargaining that delivers
full repayment in both states.
Proof. By Proposition 3, for δ1(L) = δ1(H) = 0 there exists a θ such
that for all θ < θ in the associated δ-equilibrium the marginal gains from
defaulting are lower than costs in both states. This means that for θ < θ the
δ-equilibrium originated by δ1(L) = δ1(H) = 0 is supported as equilibrium
with bargaining.
By contrast, when the borrower’s bargaining power becomes ‘too high’,
it destroys the households ability to borrow ex ante.
Corollary 4.2 For any set of model parameters there exists a θ¯ such
that if θ > θ¯, then in the model with bargaining there is no equilibrium with
positive borrowing.
Proof. Consider a set D of all pairs 0 ≤ (δˆ1(L), δˆ1(H)) < 1 such that
∀(δ1(L), δ1(H)) ∈ D households choose positive borrowing in δ-equilibrium.
By Proposition 4, there exists θ¯ such that if θ > θ¯, then none of the pairs
(δˆ1(L), δˆ1(H)) in D are supported as equilibrium with bargaining. Since D
contains all combinations of default rates that yield positive borrowing, with
θ > θ¯ there are no (δˆ1(L), δˆ1(H)) that yield positive borrowing in equilibrium
with bargaining.
Therefore, an increase in the borrowers’ bargaining power may compro-
mise their ability to borrow. On Figure 5 we plot equilibrium values of Home
households expected utility, default rate and the level of borrowing that arise
in the model with bargaining, depending on the Home’s bargaining power.
When the borrowers’ bargaining power is low, they are forced to fully re-
pay the debt in both states, and borrowing is risk-free. When the bargaining
power increases beyond 0.21, the default rate in the low state rises. At higher
δ1(L) households wish to borrow more, as the repayment on the bonds now
correlates negatively with the productivity shock, and issuing more debt pro-
motes consumption smoothing across states L and H. As a result, as θ rises,
consumers’ welfare increases. This effect remains in place as long as θ is
below 0.26, but once it increases beyond this thresholds, positive borrowing
becomes unsustainable.
One conclusion we can draw from this analysis is that, even though an
increase in the bargaining power of the borrower may promote consump-
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Figure 5: Decentralized equilibrium and bargaining power
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Notes: The figure plots equilibrium variables in the model with decentralized borrowing, depending on
the borrowers’ bargaining power. The plots depict expected welfare, default rate and the interest rate.
tion smoothing and raise welfare, bargaining power that is ‘too high’ will
undermine the ability to borrow ex ante.
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4 Centralized Economy
In the previous section we made two observations. First, bargaining process
causes inefficiency as the rate of default under bargaining turns out to be
lower than that ensuring full consumption smoothing. Consequently, house-
holds are left exposed to productivity shocks. Second, raising the bargaining
power of the borrowers does not fully resolve this problem, as the bargaining
power that is ‘too high’ destroys equilibrium with positive borrowing, making
it infeasible to borrow ex ante.
In this section we consider a centralized version of our model with bar-
gaining, where all decisions are made by a benevolent social planner who,
however, has to comply with the bargaining process. In this economy the
planner chooses the amount of borrowing and capital, and internalizes their
effect on bond prices and default rates.
4.1 Solution
The timing of decisions is as follows: in period 0 the planner chooses amounts
of borrowing and capital; in the beginning of period 1 the renegotiation oc-
curs; given the default rates, the planner then chooses borrowing and capital
in period 1. We solve this problem recursively. We start in period 1, after
the default rates are announced. Given δ1(L), δ1(H), and b0, k0 chosen in
period 0, we determine the planner’s decisions over consumption, borrowing
and capital from period 1 onward. Given those decisions, we express the
values of autarky and repayment as functions of period 0 choices, interest
rate, default rate and state: V R(b0, k0, I0, δ(s), s), V A(k0, s). Then, given
planner’s period 1 response functions and the equilibrium definition of I0, we
determine the outcome of the Nash Bargaining Problem and express default
rates in each state as functions of date zero variables, δ1(s, b0, k0). Finally,
given the default rate functions we determine the planner’s period 0 choices
over b0 and k0. Below we give a brief technical formulation of this problems.
In a state s of period 1, after a renegotiation, the planner chooses alloca-
tions for periods 1 and 2:
{ ¯V R}h1(s) = u(c1(s)) + βu(c2(s))→ max (44)
s.t. c1(s) + k1(s) + (1− δ1(s))b0I0 = A1(s)(1 + Z)kα0 + b1(s), (45)
c2(s) + b1(s)I
w
1 = A2(s)(1 + Z)k
α
1 . (46)
This problem yields first-order conditions identical to those arising in a de-
centralized version of our economy. In subsection 2.1 we established that
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for CRRA utility we can directly derive consumption in periods 1 and 2—
it is given by (28). Substituting consumption functions into { ¯V R}1(s) =
u(c1(s)) + βu(c2(s)) we obtain Home value function in period 1 under rene-
gotiation: V R(b0, k0, I0 δ(s)).
Next, we determine the value function associated with autarky. Under
autarky in period 1 the planner solves:
{ ¯V A}h1(s) = u(c1(s)) + βu(c2(s))→ max (47)
s.t. c1(s) + k1(s) = A1(s)k
α
0 (48)
c2(s) = A2(s)k
α
1 (49)
Once again, the first-order conditions mirror those of the decentralized model.
As we point out in subsection 2.1, solving this problem and plugging resulting
consumption choices into { ¯V A}1(s) = u(c1(s)) + βu(c2(s)) gives the value of
autarky as function of k0.
Having obtained { ¯V R}h1(s) and { ¯V A}h1(s), we now go to period 0 and
characterize the planner’s choice for b0, k0, given constraints originating from
bargaining. In period 0 the planner solves:
E0W = u(c0) + β[piV RL1 (k0, b0, I0, δ1(L), L) +
+(1− pi)V RH1 (k0, b0, I0, δ1(H))] → max
s.t. A0(1 + Z)k
α
−1 + b0 ≥ c0 + k0, (50)
u′(c1(b0, k0, I0, δ(L), L))I0b0
≤ 1− θ
θ
V R(b0, k0, I0, δ(L), L)− V A(k0, L)
1− δ1(L) , (51)
u′(c1(b0, k0, I0, δ(H), H))I0b0
≤ 1− θ
θ
V R(b0, k0, I0, δ(H), H)− V A(k0, H)
1− δ1(H) , (52)
I0 =
Iw0
1− piδ1(L)− (1− pi)δ1(H) , (53)
δ1(s) ≥ 0, (54)
for s = L,H.
The planner internalizes the effect period 0 borrowing and capital have
on bargaining outcomes, and (51) and (52) guarantee that equilibrium allo-
cation complies with the bargaining mechanism. In section 3 we show that
without loss of generality we can restrict attention to an equilibrium with
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full repayment in high state, and default in low. Consider an equilibrium in
which condition (52) is not binding, and there is partial default in the low
state. Default rate in the low state is determined through,
u′ [c1(b0, k0, I0(δ(L), δ(H) = 0), δ(L), L)]
Iw0
1− piδ1(L)b0 =
=
1− θ
θ
V R [b0, k0, I0(δ(L), δ(H) = 0), δ(L), L]− V A [k0, L]
1− δ1(L) , (55)
and is a function of period 0 borrowing and capital choices. Denote the δ(L)
that solves (55) as δ∗(b0, k0). We can now write the first order condition
characterizing the planner’s choice of b0 in period 0:
u′(c0) + βpi
∂V R(L)
∂δ∗
∂δ∗(b0, k0)
∂b0
= βI0
2∑
s=1
pi(s)(1− δ1(s))∂u(c1(s))
∂c1(s)
−
−β ∂I0
∂δ∗
∂δ∗(b0, k0)
∂b0
· (56)
·
[
pi
∂V R(L)
∂I0
+ (1− pi)∂V R(H)
∂I0
]
The new term on the left-hand side of (56) appears because the planner
understands that higher borrowing today will result in higher default rate in
the low state, amounting to a gain in tomorrow’s expected utility. The new
term on the right-hand side emerges because the planner also understands
that through default rate borrowing will affect the interest rate on bonds,
making repayment costlier and lowering tomorrow’s utility.
Substituting derivatives and simplifying, we obtain:
u′(c0) = βI0
2∑
s=1
pi(s)(1− δ1(s))∂u(c1(s))
∂c1(s)
− (57)
−β pi(1− pi)
1− piδ∗(b0, k0)I0b0
[
u
′
(c1(L))− u′(c1(H))
] ∂δ∗(b0, k0)
∂b0
.
Given that consumption in the low state is lower than in the high state, and
that higher debt stock means higher haircut after renegotiation, the right-
hand side of (57) is lower compared to that of the first order condition in
the decentralized model: the planner has additional incentive to accumulate
debt, as higher debt stock will allow the government to bargain for higher
default rates in the low state.
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The first order condition for capital investment in period 0 is:
u′(c0) = β
2∑
s=1
pi(s)R1(s)
∂u(c1(s))
∂c1(s)
+ (58)
+β
pi(1− pi)
1− piδ∗(b0, k0)I0b0
[
u
′
(c1(L))− u′(c1(H))
] ∂δ∗(b0, k0)
∂k0
.
The interpretation is similar: the planner now internalizes the effect of capital
on the bargaining outcome—the default rate—and how changes of the default
rate affect consumption in period 1 directly and through changes in the
interest rate.
4.2 Centralized Economy: Numerical Results
We use the calibration adopted in section 3 (describen in subsubsection 3.1.2)
to compare features of the centralized economy with those of our baseline
model.15 Figure 6 compares partial equilibria (less the first-order condition
for b0) for centralized and decentralized economies.
16
When debt is low, both centralized and decentralized models yield full re-
payment, as the difference between value functions of autarky and repayment
is high. At full repayment there is no need for the planner to manipulate
the bargaining process. Thus, solutions for k0 in the two models coincide—
so do welfare functions. For higher levels of debt there emerges a region of
risky borrowing (depicted on Figure 6).17 In that region, for each b0 the cen-
tralized model yields higher expected welfare, higher default rate and higher
interest on bonds, as the planner can choose k0 that improves the outcome
of bargaining. In our calibrated model the decentralized equilibrium yields
b0 = 0.922, which does not correspond to the peak of expected welfare in
neither model. This inefficiency arises because the households do not factor
in the effect their borrowing and capital investment have on the bond price
schedule. In the centralized version of the model the planner manipulates
15To solve for the centralized equilibrium in MATLAB we used the fmincon solver,
imposing (51) and (52) as nonlinear constraints.
16The reader may wonder why expected welfare functions, default rates and interest
schedules of the two solutions do not coincide. But recall that the planner optimizes not
only over b0, but also over k0. If we allowed households to choose k0, then the planner’s
solution over b0 would give default, interest and welfare functions similar to those observed
in a decentralized case (and solution would be at the perk of expected welfare function).
17We only depict equilibria associated with default in low state and full repayment in
high: as discussed in subsection 3.1, this is the combination that improves consumption
smoothing.
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Figure 6: Centralized vs. Decentralized
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Notes: The figure plots partial equilibrium values (less first-order condition for borrowing), depending
on the amount of debt. The figure contrast the results for decentralized and centralized models. The
plots depict expected welfare, default rate, interest rate and the amount of capital investment.
the renegotiation surplus of period 1 to improve domestic bargaining stance
and tilt the outcome of renegotiation toward more default.
When debt exceeds a threshold of ≈ 0.924 the decentralized economy
starts to display properties depicted on Figure 4 of subsection 3.2, and pos-
itive borrowing ceases to be feasible. This happens because with high debt
burden fully defaulting on debt becomes more beneficial, and Home’s surplus
from renegotiation ({ ¯V R}h1(s)−{ ¯V A}h1(s)) drops. This improves Home’s bar-
gaining stance and allows for more default in both states. But as discussed
in subsection 3.2, such improvement undermines Home’s ability to borrow in
the first place.
If in period 0 the households could commit to repaying high portion of
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debt in period 1, despite favorable stance in the bargaining process, they
would choose to do so because this strategy would increase welfare ex ante.
However, the households cannot make such a commitment, so the foreign
creditors are not willing to lend.
Now consider the centralized model. Unlike households, the planner has
access to a form of inter-period commitment: she can choose k0 and through it
influence her bargaining stance in period 1. Specifically, the planner chooses
higher capital that raises consumption in period 1 and reduces u′(c1(L)),
making repayment less costly in terms of utility losses. Mathematically, the
planner chooses k0 to equilibrate
u′(c1(H))I0b0 =
1− θ
θ
[{V R(H)}h1 − {V A(H)}h1] .
This allows to sustain high levels of borrowing regardless of the bargaining
power.
Table 2: Comparison with the centralized economy
Variable Decentralized Optimal δ-eqm Centralized
Welfare home -3.369 -3.361 -3.368
b0 0.9218 0.9220 0.9253
δL1 0.112 0.292 0.117
I0 1.081 1.195 1.084
k0 0.542 0.541 0.544
c0 0.8739 0.8750 0.8754
c1(L) 0.8226 0.8750 0.8232
c1(H) 0.928 0.875 0.926
Notes: The table compares equilibrium allocations for the baseline decentralized model, the optimal
δ-equilibrium and the centralized model.
Table 2 compares the decentralized equilibrium with bargaining, the max-
imum achieved under δ-equilibrium and the centralized equilibrium. The
planner improves upon the expected welfare of the decentralized model. How-
ever, the δ-equilibrium still yields the highest welfare. Notice that in the cen-
tralized economy period 0 borrowing, consumption and capital investment
are the highest. The planner borrows more to raise current consumption
and invest into more capital, so that in period 1 bargaining results in partial
repayment and thereby allows for borrowing in the first place. At the same
time, higher level of debt still improves the outcome of bargaining for the
planner allowing for higher default rate compared to the decentralized case.
Compared to the centralized model, the optimal δ-equilibrium delivers a
higher default rate pared with lower level of borrowing and capital. Since in
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δ-equilibrium there is no bargaining, raising capital and debt does not yield
an improvement. Thus, in the centralized model the fact that the planner is
constrained by bargaining process prevents full consumption smoothing.
5 Macroprudential Policy and Taxing
Capital Flows
In the previous section we have established that the presence of a social
planner can alleviate inefficiencies that occur in a decentralized model with
bargaining. By manipulating capital investment the planner can ensure that
positive borrowing is feasible and raise equilibrium default rates. We now
ask whether a government of a decentralized economy could play a similar
role through macroprudential regulation.
We go back to the decentralized model of section 2 and introduce a tax on
capital investment, τ , imposed in period 0. The revenue from tax collection
is given back to households in the form of a lump-sum transfer:
c0 + k0(1 + τ) = w0l0 + tr +R0k−1 + b0, (59)
k0τ = tr. (60)
When τ < 0, the government imposes a capital subsidy financed through a
lump-sum tax.
The presence of τ alters the relative price of capital faced by households,
modifying their first-order condition with regard to capital investment:
∂u(c0)
∂c0
· (1 + τ) = β
2∑
s=1
pi(s)R1(s)
∂u(c1(s))
∂c1(s)
, (61)
while all other budget constraints and first-order conditions remain unchanged.
We solve numerically for the optimal τ ∗. Figure 7 depicts partial equi-
librium (less the first-order condition for b0), in which for each level of b0
we calculate a unique value of τ that maximizes households’ welfare. The
dashed lines indicate equilibrium in the decentralized model with τ = 0 and
the equilibrium in an economy where τ is chosen optimally to maximize wel-
fare. We observe that welfare-improving τ is negative, meaning that the
government chooses to subsidize capital investment. This result is in line
with observations made in section 4, in which we documented that a social
planner would choose capital that exceeds equilibrium value derived for the
decentralized economy with no macroprudential policy.
Table 3 compares allocations obtained in the baseline model with bargain-
ing, in the optimal δ-equilibrium, in the centralized model with bargaining
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Figure 7: Optimal capital subsidy
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expected welfare, default rate, the amount of capital investment and the optimal subsidy.
and in the decentralized model with optimal capital subsidy. The centralized
economy and the economy with capital subsidy display higher levels of debt
an capital than those observed in the decentralized economy, which, again,
stipulates the role played by capital investment financed through extra for-
eign borrowing. Furthermore, borrowing and capital in these two models
exceed the corresponding values documented for the optimal δ-equilibrium.
This suggests that the pareto-improving effect of capital is tied to bargain-
ing process: in economy with optimal default there is no need to commit to
repayment through capital over-accumulation.
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Table 3: Capital subsidy: comparison with previous results
Variable Decentralized Optimal δ-eqm Centralized Optimal τ
Welfare home -3.3688 -3.3606 -3.3683 -3.3684
b0 0.9218 0.9220 0.9253 0.9259
dL1 0.1120 0.2917 0.1172 0.1172
I0 1.0809 1.1946 1.0839 1.0839
k0 0.542 0.541 0.544 0.545
c0 0.8739 0.8750 0.8754 0.8741
c1(L) 0.8226 0.8750 0.8232 0.8239
c1(H) 0.928 0.875 0.926 0.927
c1(H) - - - -0.004
Notes: The table compares equilibrium allocations for the baseline decentralized model, the optimal
δ-equilibrium, the centralized model and the decentralized model with optimal subsidy.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we studied the nexus between private borrowing and centralized
renegotiation and concluded that in such an environment bargaining gener-
ates suboptimal outcomes. The problem is twofold. First, expected default
rates are too low compared to the Pareto optimum that would allow private
agents to hedge against output fluctuations. Second, if the anticipated hair-
cuts in the event of default are different from the optimum (either too low or
too high), the volume of external debt extended is inefficiently low or even
zero.
Macroprudential policy that favorably distorts the investment rate in cap-
ital can resolve both problems stated above: higher capital investment acts
as an ex ante assurance that repayment of a large portion of debt will occur
ex post. At the same time, higher investment necessitates more borrowing,
which then leads to higher expected default rates that, as we argue, can be
Pareto-improving. This contributes to the discussion concerning reforms that
should be undertaken by troubled economies, a discussion that is especially
current for countries that sought assistance with the ‘troika’ and where then
obliged to approve a package of reforms.
Our argument contributes to the literature on macroprudential regula-
tion, particularly to the discussion about over- and underborrowing. Bianchi
and Mendoza (2015) and Jeanne and Korinek (2010) show that the fact that
private agents do not internalize the effect their borrowing has on collateral
prices amplifies booms and busts along the business cycles. They conclude
that policies that combat overborrowing are welfare-improving. By contrast,
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2016) show that in a framework where multiple
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equilibria are possible a similar environment with collateral constraints will
generate underborrowing, as agents will attempt to self-insure against bad
times.
Unlike this literature, we do not incorporate collateral constraints, but
include partial defaults and bargaining. The externality present in our model
leads to underborrowing because debt contracts imply that repayment will
occur even if the economy is in a severe economic downturn. This renders
private sector borrowing less effective in smoothing consumption across states
and leads private agents to borrow less. This inefficiency is exacerbated
in an environment where private agents do not internalize the effect their
borrowing has on equilibrium bargaining outcomes, a result that echos Kim
and Zhang (2012) who also examine a model of decentralized borrowing and
conclude that it leads to suboptimal debt levels and impaired welfare. Our
argument regarding default rates that are ‘too low’ complements that of
Krugman (1988), who stress that in some circumstances creditors are better
off forgiving a large portion of the debt rather than financing the debtor
country in hopes that it would repay in full in the future.
A limitation of our approach is that our model does not incorporate in-
equilibrium costs resulting from partial default—the output loss in our model
triggers default, but default (given orderly renegotiation) does not cause
further output losses. We would argue that a successful renegotiation over
a haircut and provision of financial aid does not in itself depress economic
activity.18 At the same time, we recognize that even orderly restructuring of
bank debt may initiate bank panic and financial turmoil. A future research
in this area could incorporate the feedback between losses associated with
private debt restructuring and the bargaining process.
18Furthermore, as argued by Yeyati and Panizza (2011), empirically sovereign default
events often signal the beginning of economic recovery.
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Appendix A: Decentralized borrowing,
centralized renegotiation:
historical cases
Appendix A:.1 Ireland 2008-2012
In the period preceding 2008 Ireland experienced construction boom. Irish
banks funded growing demand for loans by borrowing abroad, raising net
foreign borrowing to 60 percent of GDP compared to 10 percent in 2003.19
In 2008, following a sharp decline in house prices, the largest Irish bank,
Anglo Irish Bank, started rapidly loosing funds. Fears of looming banking
crisis prompted Irish government to take action: on September 30, 2008 it
announced that it had extended guarantees to deposits of six largest Irish
banks. Following this announcement, the CDS spreads on government bonds
soared. In an effort to save the banks the government took further actions
that included buying non-performing loans from the banks via the National
Asset Management Agency (NAMA) set up in 2009, and eventually nation-
alizing five of the six biggest banks. In 2010, following further increases in
spreads on sovereign bonds, the Irish government lost access to financial mar-
ket and in November 2010 was forced to request assistance from the ‘troika’
(the EC, the ECB and the IMF), reaching an agreement on a 67.5 billion
euro financial support. I July 2012 Ireland regained partial access to the
financial market. In 2013 Ireland exchanged 25 billion high interest (about
8%) promissory notes used to bail out Anglo Irish Bank for lower cost (about
3%) long term government debt.20
19For detailed accounts of Irish crisis, see Whelan (2014), Honohan (2009)
20Source: OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook 2014
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